Now that hostilities appear to be decreasing in Iraq (notwithstanding the tenuous standoff between Turkey and the PKK), this might be a good time to step back, and rather than pat ourselves on the back for the fledgling successes of the Surge, take a closer look at why this war has dragged on for as long as it has and how we can avoid this in future conflicts.
Back in February 2003, just one month before Operation Iraqi Freedom, two members of the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, authored a report entitled “Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario.”
In the Forward to his 84-page report, Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., SSI Director, wrote these prophetic words:
“If this nation and its coalition partners decide to undertake the mission to remove Saddam Hussein, they will also have to be prepared to dedicate considerable time, manpower, and money to the effort to reconstruct Iraq after the fighting is over. Otherwise, the success of military operations will be ephemeral, and the problems they were designed to eliminate could return or be replaced by new and more virulent difficulties.”
The report itself consists of three parts. The first part discusses 20th century post-war operations from an historical perspective; The second part analyzes unique challenges posed by a post-war Iraq. In the third part, Crane and Terrill provide a detailed “mission matrix” consisting of some 135 tasks, organized in 21 categories, which they deemed necessary for winning the peace in Iraq.
Crane and Terrill presented their initial findings to a joint and interagency workshop in December 2002. Unfortunately, by the time the final report was published in February 2003, the die was already cast. The Bush Administration had already decided that they could accomplish the post-conflict mission with considerably less time, manpower, and money than Crane and Terrill proposed. And, as Director Lovelace predicted, the success of military operations were indeed ephemeral, and the problems they were designed to eliminate did in fact return and were replaced by new and more virulent difficulties.
Crane and Terrill foresaw much of the ethnic and tribal problems between Sunnis and Shi’ites that plagued Iraq for the last four years and even predicted the Kurdish problems that now loom on the horizon. The lesson to be learned: plan from the outset at least as well for the peace as for the war.
Here’s a link to the Crane-Terrill Report:
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB182.pdf
I think we should have taken our lessons from the history of all great empires. The Greeks, the Romans, they when going to war gave the enemy two options. Total surrender and cooperation or total destruction. Even Saddam knew that.
4000 American lives later and trillions of dollars, and we are no better off than when it all started. To bad we didn’t think like Romans or Spartans. Kill them all, take the oil, and let allah sort out the good from the bad.
4000 American lives later and trillions of dollars, and we are no better off than when it all started.
When my wife and I were in Germany late June/early July, we watched a 10-minute daily program on the American Forces Network called “Freedom Journal Iraq.” Sure, it’s one-sided, only showing the good things that are happening in Iraq, and the reporters aren’t as polished as those on the broadcast or cable networks. But when viewed alongside the bad news, it gives one a more balanced picture of what’s really going on over there.
Now that the so-called mainstream media is reporting much less from Iraq (“good news is no news”), this show fills in the gap. Progress may be tenuous, and we’re still far from anything that could be remotely characterized as “success,”
but if you’re interested in a side of the picture that doesn’t get nearly enough play stateside, here’s a link to “Freedom Journal Iraq”:
http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogcategory&id=50&Itemid=163